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Numerous courts have dealt with the question whether the sexual identity of an
individual enjoys constitutional protection as freedom of expression. Recently,
Singapore’s Supreme Court has rejected this understanding of the freedom of
expression which highlights the different approaches of courts across countries like
Singapore, India, Botswana, and Kenya.
Ong Ming Johnson: Speech is Silver as well as
Golden
Little more than a month ago, the single judge bench in Ong Ming Johnson and
Attorney General, upheld the loosely worded , section 377(A) of the Penal Code
which criminalizes “acts of gross indecency among males, in private or public” as
constitutionally valid. The antecedent, section 377, that criminalized coitus “against
the order of nature” was repealed in 2017. However, sexual conduct not amounting
to intercourse among consenting or non-consenting homosexual males in public or
private is still deemed as an outrage to decency and remains unlawful under section
377(A).
Article 14 of the Constitution of Singapore protects the freedom of speech and
expression. In its decision, the Supreme Court of Singapore held first, that freedom
of speech and expression did not encompass non-verbal communications and,
second, that homosexuality was consequently not a form of expression. Referring
to the marginal note to article 14, which only mentions “speech, assembly and
association” and omits “expression”, the Court circumscribed the ambit of the
freedom to include speech stricto sensu, i.e. only verbal communication. Interpreting
statutes by using marginal notes has been a consistent bone of contention. They
are not the obvious pick from the interpretation toolbox available to Courts. The
Supreme Court of India, for instance, has asserted that they are only used as aids to
clear ambiguity regarding the meaning of the provision. In case of a conflict between
the inference from an otherwise clear and unambiguous provision and the marginal
note, the latter has to yield. However, the Supreme Court of Singapore chose to
overemphasize the role of the marginal note to section 377(A). Narrowing the scope
of application of the freedom of expression under article 14 of the Constitution, the
Singaporean Court left non-verbal communication which would encompass beliefs,
choices, mannerisms, dress etc. outside the scope of protection. Thus, there is no
right of freedom of expression independent of freedom of speech available according
to the Court.
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Navtej Johar: Homosexuality as a Form of
Expression
The Singaporean judgment is in stark contrast that of the Indian Supreme Court in
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India of 2018 in which the Supreme Court of India
decriminalized sexual conduct between consenting homosexual adults.
Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution mirrors Article 14 of Singapore’s
Constitution and guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and
expression. This right should not be curtailed within doctrinal boundaries, and it is
considered the sine qua non for the realization of an identity in dignity and freedom.
No law should have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and expression.
In the context of gender, freedom of expression encompasses the choice of and
inclination toward one’s gender identity which includes realizing the same via dress,
speech, mannerisms, choice of partner, acknowledgement of relationships etc.
Enabling a meaningful existence by ensuring an individual’s dignity forms the basis
of the bundle of rights protected by article 19, viz. the right to freedom of movement,
residence, formation of associations or practicing any profession etc. The Court
noted how the right to form associations, practice trade and occupation of their
choice under article 19(1)(g) fell prey to social stigma and fear of state action that
were byproducts of the bygone law. Consequently, when the freedom of speech and
expression under article 19(1)(a) is unreasonably restricted, the realization of other
concomitant freedoms is impeded. The right to freedom of speech and expression in
this context had been curtailed for reasons of decency and morality which constitute
reasonable restrictions under the limitation clause of article 19(2).
Gauging the reasonability of the restrictions is a delicate undertaking and there can
be no straightjacket formula for the assessment. The Indian courts used to employ
the Hicklin test, pursuant to which the indecent expression must meet the high
threshold of “obscenity” and possess the tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds
of individuals to warrant a restriction. The Hicklin test was junked and succeeded
by the proportionality test of ascertaining the reasonability and henceforth, the
validity of the law on account of its proportionality to the legitimate aim and social
need sought to be achieved. A law that uses the least restrictive means in achieving
the aim and is not too remote or conjectural to the societal need would pass that
test. The new step annexed to the aforementioned test is what the Court has given
the nomenclature of constitutional morality. It requires a progressive weighing of
the societal values and morals as against the constitutional freedoms, with the
latter taking precedence. The Court recognized that the freedom of expression
is a condition precedent for the survival of constitutional morality. Yet another
aspect of freedom of expression discussed in the judgement was with respect
to the freedom of choice of two consenting adults to perform a sexual activity
for purposes other than procreation, which would not be deemed as against the
order of nature. The explicit recognition of homosexuality as a form of expression,
constitutionally protected is in conformity with international perspectives which were
amply contemplated by the Court in the judgement.
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(De)Criminalizing Sexual Identity
India’s stamp of approval on gender expression as constitutionally safeguarded
was also successfully invoked in Motshidiemang v. Attorney General before the
High Court of Botswana (para.140 and 147): Referring to Navtey Singh Johar v.
Union of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, the Court decriminalized homosexuality
and upheld it as a form of expression for similar reasons. Contrarily, the High
Court of Kenya in EG v. Attorney General deemed that it should be wary of foreign
jurisprudence and did not look into the question of homosexuality as a form of
expression that the petitioners had raised by invoking Navtej Johar. The Court
upheld the criminalization of sexual conduct among same-sex individuals for reasons
of the moral inclinations of the society.
More and more nations have called in unison for repeal of laws prohibiting or
criminalizing expression of sexual orientation and gender identity and for affirmative
action to ensure full enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression regardless of
sexual or gender orientation. The judgement in Navtej Johar captures the essence
of inclusivity that pervades throughout the Constitution, by declaring how social
morality, however rigid or structural, must be subject to constitutional morality. The
responsibility of constitutional courts goes beyond merely judging on the validity
of penal provisions but extends to realizing constitutional values and guaranteeing
those to every individual.
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